A society of sheep must in
time beget a government of wolves.- Bertrand de Juvenal
It's no secret that much of the news reported in
Israel's Hebrew-language media never reaches the mainstream
American press, for the simple reason that items unfavorable to Israel
generally are not translated. And, because very few Israelis break this
self-imposed censorship, items from the Hebrew press that do appear may be
much more newsworthy than their anemic English translations indicate.
It was a bit stunning, therefore, to read an article in Strategic
Assessment, the quarterly bulletin issued by the Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. The report, titled "The War in
Iraq: An Intelligence Failure?" was written by Shlomo Brom, a brigadier
general in the Israeli army reserves, and said what no one seems to.
Shockingly, it told the full truth about the American and British
intelligence "sources" making the case for war.
In fact, according to Brom, these sources were utterly compromised by
Israeli intelligence, which made the case for starting the war and kept it
going as long as necessary. The retired general described Israel as a
"full partner" in U.S. and British intelligence failures that exaggerated
Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in the lead up to
the U.S.-led invasion.
Israeli intelligence sources and political leaders provided "an
exaggerated assessment of Iraqi capabilities," raising "the possibility
that the intelligence had been manipulated," wrote Brom, former deputy
chief of planning for the Israeli army.
Brom said his remarks were directed at Israel's military intelligence,
air force intelligence and the Mossad intelligence agency. Similar
allegations have surfaced from U.S. and British sources following months
of futile efforts to uncover evidence of Iraq's prewar weapons programs.
In a Dec. 5 article, Washington Post correspondent Molly Moore quoted
from the report: "In the questioning of the picture painted by coalition
intelligence, the third party in this intelligence failure, Israel has
remained in the shadows. . . . A critical question to be answered is
whether governmental bodies falsely manipulated the intelligence
information in order to gain support for their decision to go to war in
Iraq, while the real reasons for this decision were obfuscated or
concealed."
Articles by Laura King of The Los Angeles Times, Peter Enav of
Salon.com.News, and the Associated Press also appeared on the report.
Brig. Gen. Brom's criticism of the Israeli intelligence community-which
many Americans believe to be one of, if not the world's best-was unusual.
Like many retired intelligence officers, Brom, who retired after a 25-year
career, most likely continued to be privy to a great deal of sensitive
government information.
According to Brom, Israeli intelligence "badly overestimated the Iraqi
threat to Israel and reinforced the American and British belief that the
weapons existed."
Attributing the poor intelligence to a lack of professionalism and poor
supervision, Brom wrote, "Even if Iraq had any Scud missiles left, I can't
understand how Israeli intelligence officers came to believe they
threatened Israel, particularly when they hadn't been used in more than
10 years. It's a clear example of how inability to think clearly is
undermining the Israeli intelligence community."
Brom also cited bitter memories of the 1973-74 Middle East war, "when
Israeli intelligence failed to anticipate an attack by Egypt and Syria,
and the country suffered thousands of casualties."
As Brom observed in his report, "Israeli intelligence agencies have
tended to overstate the threat the country faces ever since 1973."
Wrote The Post's Moore: "[T]he study did not cite specific exchanges of
intelligence. Israeli officials frequently told foreign journalists before
the war that Israel and the United States were sharing information,
particularly regarding Iraqi missiles and non-conventional weapons that
could possibly be used against Israel. The report accused intelligence
agencies of being blinded by a one-dimensional perception of Saddam
Hussein."
Moore continued, "At the heart of this perception lay the colorful
portrait of an embodiment of evil, a man possessed by a compulsion to
develop weapons of mass destruction in order to strike Israel and others,
regardless of additional considerations.
"'When Israeli intelligence became aware that certain items had been
transferred by the head of the regime from Iraq to Syria,'" Moore quoted
the report as saying, "'Israeli intelligence immediately portrayed
it-including in leaks to the media-as if Iraq was moving banned weapons
out of Iraq in order to conceal them.'"
Brom criticized Israeli intelligence for failing to include the more
probable scenario that Saddam Hussein and his aides were moving cash or
family members out of the country in the face of an impending attack.
"The study noted," Moore wrote, "that Israeli and U.S. governments have
disagreed over the past decade on the weight of various threats in the
Middle East." The report said Israel has generally claimed that Iran
poses a more serious threat than Iraq, because the latter was contained
and under control."
Moore further quoted the Brom report as saying that: "Once the Bush
administration decided to take action against Iraq, it was more difficult
for Israel to maintain its position that dealing with Iraq was not the
highest priority, especially when it was obvious that the war would serve
Israel's interests."
One thing is certain. Israel's competing intelligence service soon will
begin-if they haven't already-to write scenarios explaining why it will be
necessary to bomb Iranian weapons technology, and a whole new virtual
weapons industry will materialize.
Richard H. Curtiss is an executive editor with the Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs. |
Queen
Victoria
